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Abstract
To understand how climate adaptation planning and decision-making will progress, a better understanding is needed as to which
organisations are expected to take on key responsibilities. Methodological challenges have impeded efforts to identify and track
adaptation actors beyond the coarse scale of nation states. Yet, for effective adaptation to succeed, who do national governments
need to engage, support and encourage? Using the UK as a case study, we conducted a systematic review of official government
documents on climate adaptation, between 2006 and 2015, to understand which organisations are identified as key to future
adaptation efforts and tracked the extent to which these organisations changed over time. Our unique longitudinal dataset found a
very large number of organisations (n = 568). These organisations varied in size (small-medium enterprises to large multina-
tionals), type (public, private and not-for-profit), sector (e.g. water, energy, transport and health), scale (local, national and
international), and roles and responsibilities (policymaking, decision-making, knowledge production, retail). Importantly, our
findings reveal a mismatch between official government policies that repeatedly call on private organisations to drive adaptation,
on the one hand, and a clear dominance of the public sector on the other hand. Yet, the capacity of organisations to fulfil the roles
and responsibilities assigned to them, particularly in the public sector, is diminishing. Unless addressed, climate adaptation
actions could be assigned to those either unable, or unwilling, to implement them.
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Introduction
If mitigation alone cannot reverse the risks posed by climate
change, attention rightly shifts to how to help communities,
businesses and governments prepare for, and adapt to, the
unavoidable impacts to come. Such thinking is embodied in
the 2015 Paris Accord’s global goal on adaptation. Since its
signing, a considerable level of resources, both public and
private, has been directed towards enhancing adaptive capac-
ities, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerabilities to
climate change (UNFCCC 2016: Article 7). But, as
Christiansen et al. (2018) explain, it is not always clear how
well these efforts have translated into a more resilient and less
vulnerable society or where future efforts are needed.
Disagreements over what exactly constitutes ‘successful’ or
‘effective’ adaptation (Dupuis and Biesbroek 2013; Ford et al.
2013), inconsistencies in the availability and reliability of met-
rics for measuring progress (Ford et al. 2015; Ford and Berrang-
Ford 2016; Kamperman and Biesbroek 2017), and difficulties
in assessing whether those assigned adaptation roles/
responsibilities are able, and willing, to act (Eisenack and
Stecker 2012; Porter et al. 2015), reveal the complex, contested
and messy nature of adaptation in practice. Adaptation
research’s preference for single, or small-n case studies, only
adds further problems (Swart et al. 2014). Such studies, whilst
helpful in explaining why adaptation is contingent upon wider
socio-technical and institutional-political considerations, can al-
so limit the identification of lessons across different regions,
sectors and contexts (Dupuis and Biesbroek 2013).
Adaptation tracking has emerged in response. Put simply, it
champions the use of a systematic and standardised criteria
from which adaptation can be evaluated and compared over
time as well as across regions/sectors (Ford et al. 2013, 2015;
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Christiansen et al. 2018). As a result, documenting adaptation
progress, prioritising funding for areas of greatest concern and
identifying where governance gaps exist can now be performed
more effectively, transparently and accountably.
Lesnikowski et al. (2016), for instance, used adaptation tracking
to compare the progressmade bydifferent countries via an analysis
of National Communications submissions to the United Nations
Framework Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC). In doing
so, different levels of commitment, and different capacities to
adapt, were identified across the world. Only eight countries
achieved the highest ‘global leader’ status: Australia, Canada,
Finland, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Spain and the United
Kingdom (UK). Putting aside the widely held, if not critiqued,
perception that adaptation is primarily a local process (Preston
et al. 2014; Atteridge and Remling 2018), such global analyses
emphasise the need to understand why some countries are
progressing on adaptation better than others. This focus on national
governments is understandable, as the Stern Review (2006) ar-
gues, because they are responsible for (1) protecting those least
able to adapt by addressing the causes of their vulnerability, (2)
providing information and resources to help plan and stimulate
adaptation and (3) offering protection to public goods including
air quality, ecosystems and flood defences (Stern 2006).
But as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
(IPCC) latest assessment report explains, progress on adapta-
tion depends heavily on the involvement of two other actors:
local government and the private sector (Noble et al. 2014: p.
836). ‘These two groups [will] bear responsibility for translat-
ing the top-down flow of risk information and financing and in
scaling up bottom-up efforts of communities and households
in planning and implementing their selected adaptation ac-
tions’ (ibid). Despite efforts from national governments to
get private businesses, local government and civil society to
engage with the risks and opportunities posed by climate
change, and in turn, offer them support to plan and adapt,
adaptation remains heavily dominated by central government
initiatives and it is unclear to what extent these have effective-
ly translated into local government action (cf. Tompkins et al.
2010). This is concerning because as Green et al. (2018) have
found, it is crucial to involve a wide diversity of actors with
different issues, from different sectors, working across differ-
ent scales, to ensure different values, interests and concerns
are represented in efforts to tackle climate change. How to do
this is not always clear. Much debate persists over when and
where different actors should be introduced into the adaptation
process or even which actors are key (Biesbroek et al. 2011;
Tompkins and Eakin 2012; Juhola 2013; Klein et al. 2017).
For Berkhout (2012: p. 91), ‘organisations [are] the prima-
ry actors involved in choosing and enacting societal responses
to climate change’. Organisations, in this case, are collectives
of actors whose activities are coordinated within discrete so-
cial conditions to achieve common goals. These include pri-
vate businesses, public organisations (e.g. central/local
governments), charities and civil society. Whether climate
change, or adaptation more specifically, steers organisational
behaviour depends on the extent to which it compliments
existing strategic goals. These goals range widely from profit
seeking to more socially responsive aspirations around educa-
tion, healthcare and welfare (Berkhout 2012). Likewise, orga-
nisations have different structures, cultures and capabilities to
help achieve their goals (Willows and Connell 2003; Arnell
and Delaney 2006; Berkhout et al. 2006; Hoffman et al. 2009;
Green et al. 2018). Such realities remind us that economic
thinking alone rarely guarantees action. As Berkhout (2012:
p. 92) put it, ‘even in organisations, like farming businesses,
that appear highly exposed to climate variability, responses to
climate change will always compete as a priority with other
strategic or operational concerns’.
Given that the UK is considered to be a global leader on
adaptation (Lesnikowski et al. 2016), we aim to shed light on
which organisations and sectors are seen to be key adaptation
actors by the UK government. Using a unique longitudinal
dataset, presented here for the first time, we conducted a system-
atic review of UK official government documents on climate
adaptation, published between 2006 and 2015, to identify which
organisations are seen as key to future adaptation efforts and
track the extent to which the pattern of organisations identified
in these documents changes over time. Before explaining our
data and method, we provide a brief overview of the UK’s ad-
aptation context and the roles and responsibilities of key organi-
sations. Following on, our results examine which organisations
are most frequently cited within official documents and how
these organisations vary in type and sector. Building on this,
we explore how the pattern of organisations identified in the
reports changes over a 10-year period, as different government
administrations have come and gone, and whether the capacity
exists for these organisations to adapt. To close, we will examine
to what extent the current UK government rhetoric on adaptation
as championed through its National Adaptation Plans matches
the reality of those actors advocated by the government to prog-
ress adaptation and call attention to what happens when climate
adaptation roles/responsibilities are centred only on a few actors.
Context: Climate change adaptation in the UK
Since the UK Climate Change Act was passed in 2008, the
administrative roles/responsibilities for climate change have
been divided between (1) mitigation policies (e.g. greenhouse
gas emission reductions, renewable technology initiatives) set
by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)1
and (2) adaptation policies (e.g. flood management, nature
1 DECC was absorbed by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
to create the new Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in
2016.
2126 S. Lorenz et al.
conservation) set by the Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs (Defra). Under the Act, the Secretary of
State for Environment can direct organisations responsible
for critical infrastructure, utilities and transport networks to
report on how they plan to tackle climate risks.
To help the government identify which organisations
should be part of this Adaptation Reporting Powers exercise,
the Climate Change Act requires a national climate change
risk assessment (CCRA) to be conducted every 5 years to rank
the severity of different risks and the vulnerability of different
sectors (Defra 2012). On top of this, the government is re-
quired to issue a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) setting out
how these risks will be addressed (Defra 2013: p. 4). A major
objective of this plan is to foster ‘a society which makes time-
ly, far-sighted and well-informed decisions to address the risks
and opportunities posed by a changing climate’ (ibid).
Emphasis here is very much on recognising the limits to what
government interventions can do. Official government policy
makes it clear that the ‘government cannot act alone’ (Defra
2013: p. 1). Local governments, industry and civil society
must take on new climate adaptation responsibilities, as they
‘know what works best in their sectors’ (ibid). To scrutinise
the progression made on adaptation, the Committee on
Climate Change was set up with its Adaptation Sub-
Committee reporting directly to Parliament. As Massey and
Huitema (2013, 2016) explain, these institutional-political
conditions have led to the unique situation of climate adapta-
tion becoming a policy field in its own right in the UK.
To help inform adaptation planning and decision-making,
the UK’s Met Office provides climate information to govern-
ment departments, through contracts with DECC and Defra,
and also releases free-to-use climate projections (Jenkins et al.
2009). To improve the uptake and use of this information, the
UKClimate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) was set up in 1997.
Working at the interface of climate science and decision-mak-
ing, UKCIP raises awareness of, and provides practical advice
on, how to adapt to climate impacts for different stakeholders
(Hedger et al. 2006). In 2011, UKCIP’s official responsibili-
ties were transferred to a new Climate Ready team in the
Environment Agency (Salvidge 2016). Already responsible
for managing flood risk, water resources and ecosystems,
the Environment Agency is a non-governmental public body
tasked with operationalising Defra’s environmental policies.
Given this considerable institutional-legislative apparatus, it
is not surprising that the UK’s approach to adaptation has large-
ly been considered to be top-down (Tompkins et al. 2010). In
2004/2005, Tompkins et al. (2010) collected and analysed doc-
umentary evidence from official sources covering 300 exam-
ples of climate adaptation. They found that although public and
private organisations were beginning to make small adjust-
ments and develop their adaptive capacities, observed adapta-
tion was still largely driven by national government initiatives.
Since 2010, successive UK governments have tried to reverse
this trend. First, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition
government, followed by the Conservative government from
2015. In 2013, the publication of the UK’s first NAP shifted
responsibility for adaptation away from the state and onto non-
state actors stating that ‘if adapting to climate change is in the
private interests of an individual and an organisation then it
should occur naturally and without the government’s interven-
tion’ (Defra 2013: p. 7). In this study, we will aim to assess
whether this rhetorical shift towards more of a bottom-up ap-
proach to adaptation is mirrored in the organisations that central
government focuses on through the documents it published on
adaptation between 2006 and 2015.
Data and methods
How to sample adapting UK organisations?
To understand which organisations have been officially as-
cribed roles and responsibilities for climate change adaptation
in the UK, and to examine the extent to which attention re-
ceived by these organisations has changed over the last decade
(2006–2015), we conducted a systematic review of official
documents prepared for, or commissioned by, the UK govern-
ment in relation to climate change adaptation. These docu-
ments included policies, plans, reports, assessments and strat-
egies. As matters of public record, these documents provide
the official grounds through which the UK government ex-
plains how adaptation risks and opportunities should be man-
aged, and most importantly, by whom. To that end, we
adopted the definition that planned adaptation is the ‘result
of a deliberate policy decision, based on an awareness that
conditions have changed or are about to change and that action
is required to return to, maintain or achieve a desired state’
(Parry et al. 2007: p. 869).
Following Turnpenny et al. (2005), we sourced documents
from UK government websites. Keyword searches were per-
formed using phrases such as ‘climate change adaptation’,
‘adaptation’ and ‘adaptation plan’. During the data collection
process, all government documents were in the process of
being migrated from individual departmental websites to a
central repository: gov.uk. However, as this process was in-
complete in October 2015, when we collected the data, we
also conducted searches within old websites such as Defra,
the Committee on Climate Change, the Met Office Hadley
Centre, UKCIP and the Water Services Regulation Authority
(Ofwat) webpages (see Online SupplementaryMaterial 1 for a
full list of searched websites and search terms). One hundred
forty-six original documents were returned as well as 27 sup-
plementary documents pertaining to them (total n = 173).
These 173 documents were downloaded into a qualitative data
software tool: NVivo (see Online Supplementary Material 2
for a full list of the 173 documents).
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How to identify UK adaptation organisations?
Our analysis centred on official documents that discussed current
and future UK adaptation actions, roles and responsibilities, and
therein, named organisations that are or should be involved. To
identify these organisations, we read the executive summaries,
introductions and conclusions of the 146 original documents
found through our government webpage search and ranked them
on a 5 point Likert Scale to indicate the extent to which the text
primarily discussed the roles/responsibilities of adaptation orga-
nisations (1, not at all relevant; 2, slightly relevant; 3, moderately
relevant; 4, very relevant; 5, extremely relevant) (see Online
Supplementary Material 3 for the full list of ranked original
documents). Documents received a low ranking if they only
provided scientific, economic or risk assessments of the impacts
of climate change in the UK. For instance, the lowest ranking of
1 was given to the PricewaterhouseCoopers report: ‘International
Threats and Opportunities of climate change for the UK’, as it
focused on mapping the risks faced by different UK sectors, not
the specific organisations per se. Whereas the highest ranking of
5 was awarded to the AEA Technology Report: ‘Adapting the
ICT sector to the impacts of climate change’ because it differen-
tiated between the urgent actions needed from various actors (e.g.
central government, ICT providers, researchers). Whilst all these
documents increase our understanding of how the UK may be
affected by climate change, and detail what options could be
explored, these same documents do not always identify which
organisations are or should be involved in that process.
Approximately a third of the documents achieved a ranking
of 3 or above (n = 50/146). This subset was examined further
to extract specific named organisations including government
departments, private businesses, trade associations, regulators
and community groups, amongst many others. This more de-
tailed reading resulted in 568 actors being identified (see
Online Supplementary Material 4 for a complete list of
actors). It is important to note that organisations referenced
in the documents can be attributed different capacities, such
as information providers, data sources, implementation part-
ners, funders for action or regulators. For example, the UK’s
first NAP designated Defra with three interrelated roles: im-
plementer of actions, policy developer and information pro-
vider. For this analysis, we do not distinguish between these
different capacities, but treat them equally, as our aim is to
capture the overarching landscape of organisations involved,
which span a wide variety of capacities, roles and
responsibilities.
How to code the UK adaptation organisations
identified?
To characterise these organisations, and better understand any
underlying trends, we introduced two levels of classification.
First, we coded each organisation according to its funding
model into public, private or not-for-profit (third sector). We
then subdivided the public sector into central, local and other.
Second, following Tompkins et al. (2010), we categorised the
primary activities of these organisations. Organisations were
coded using the following sectors: (i) agriculture; (ii) art, cul-
ture, media and sport; (iii) business; (iv) central government; (v)
charity; (vi) civil society; (vii) communications; (viii) conser-
vation and environment; (ix) construction; (x) education; (xi)
emergency; (xii) energy; (xiii) finance; (xiv) health; (xv) insur-
ance; (xvi) local government; (xvii) retail; (xviii) scientific and
technical advisory services; (xix) security; (xx) tourism; (xxi)
transport; (xxii) water and (xxiii) other (see Online
Supplementary Material 5 for a list of sectors and descriptions).
Local government and central government were included in
both sector and type categorisations. The rationale behind this
being that some organisations have responsibilities that are cross-
cutting instead of sector-specific at the local or central level.
Therefore, Parliament, Cabinet Office, Her Majesty’s
Government, Cabinet Office Briefing Room and the Office of
the Deputy Prime Minister, were assigned the ‘central govern-
ment’ type and sector and all Local Authorities and Public Local
Associations such as Local Climate Change Partnerships were
assigned the ‘local government’ type and sector.
To acknowledge the ambiguities that can arise in any cod-
ing exercise, a random sample of organisations (n = 57, ~ 10%
of the total) were coded independently by two of the authors
and intercoder reliability tests were performed showing
moderate-substantial agreement between the two coders (type:
K = .590, p < .001, sector K = .711, p < .001). These scores
achieved an acceptable standard of intercoder reliability
(Landis and Koch 1977).
How were the documents analysed?
To ascertain which organisations are expected to play the most
prominent role in climate change adaptation, we used the NVivo
query function and systematically searched all 173 documents
for mentions of the 568 organisations (including acronyms and
alternative wordings). To avoid the risk of double counting, all
searches were checked and cleaned manually to exclude organi-
sations named in the header/footer of the documents.
To determine the top 10% of organisations of greatest im-
portance, we firstly ranked all organisations based on the num-
ber of references made to each organisation across the 173
documents returned through the coding (total frequency) and
then ranked them based on the number of documents that
referred to each organisation (total documents). Recognising
that some organisations may be mentioned numerous times
within the same documents, and that thus the number of doc-
uments within which an organisation is cited, is a more accu-
rate proxy as to how relevant an organisation is considered to
be for adaptation, we applied a weighting factor to both rank-
ings. Based on this, we applied a weighting factor of 0.67 to
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‘total documents’ and a weighting factor of 0.33 to ‘total fre-
quency’. The mean rank of organisations was then calculated
from the weighted ranks and the top 10% of organisations
were extracted.
What are the limitations of the data?
Introducing a new method, inevitably, encounters chal-
lenges. The units of analysis were one such challenge.
What counts as ‘adaptation’ in official climate change
documents reviewed? Following Tompkins et al.’s
(2018) approach, we provided a comprehensive documen-
tation of all organisations mentioned in the documents
analysed instead of judging whether to include them or
not based on evaluating their adaptation actions.
Identifying organisations per se does not equate to actions
taken. However, our aim here is to map the composition
of the UK’s adaptation actor landscape. “Results” and
“Discussion and conclusion” provide insights as to wheth-
er those organisations can take meaningful action.
A more detailed matrix that ranks the relevance of organi-
sations as well as reflects the types of organisations and num-
ber of actions they have taken would be beneficial in future.
Nevertheless, our findings, outlined in “Results”, provide a
strong contribution to Tompkins et al.’s (2018) proposal of a
more coordinated stocktaking approach for adaptation actions
that (1) establishes consensus of adaptation objectives, (2)
agrees sources of evidence, (3) agrees search methods and
(4) categorises adaptations.
Another challenge is that organisational remits can span
several sectors. We decided to categorise organisations ac-
cording to their primary sector, but future studies that apply
multiple categorisations would be relevant for a multi-layered
sectoral analysis. For this study, assigning a single sector of-
fers an important first step in exploring how the UK’s adapta-
tion landscape is structured, which can be refined for future
studies as trends emerge.
Focusing on documents that were published or
commissioned by central government also arguably pro-
vides only one method for understanding the overall
adaptation landscape. That said, as Tompkins et al.
(2010) have found, the UK’s top-down approach to
adaptation—where the 2008 Climate Change Act
assigns legal dut ies that the government must
perform—means that the UK government plays a vital
role in proposing, funding, supporting and overseeing
adaptation actions, and in turn, linking networks, part-
nerships and organisations together. As a result, how the
UK government makes sense of the adaptation land-
scape, and by extension, who it ascribes roles/
responsibilities to, provides a crucial lens through which
to critically examine whether the rhetoric calling for a
more bottom-up approach to adaptation has become a
reality.
Results
Which organisations were officially assigned key roles
or responsibilities for UK climate change adaptation?
In total, our review identified 568 distinct organisations that
official documents suggest play a key role in, or have respon-
sibilities in relation to, adaptation to climate change. These
organisations varied considerably. We found different sized
organisations (e.g. from small or medium enterprises to large
multinationals), different organisational types (i.e. public, pri-
vate and third sector), organisations that work within different
sectors (e.g. water, agriculture, energy, transport and health),
across different scales (i.e. local, regional, national and inter-
national) and organisations tasked with different core roles
and/or responsibilities (e.g. policymaking, decision-making,
knowledge production or retail products/services).
At first glance, the diversity of organisations suggests that
the UK government understands that adaptation should not be
the exclusive preserve of a select few—who either have the
capacity or inclination to tackle it—and instead should engage,
and most importantly support, the inclusion of as many differ-
ent organisations as possible. Such diversity is encouraging. It
enables multiple (and divergent) adaptation strategies to be ex-
plored to avoid being locked into a single approach that, if it
fails, could have far-reaching consequences (Smit et al. 1999).
Yet when we categorised these organisations further, according
to type and sector, a more homogenous picture emerged.
Of the 568 organisations, the majority were publicly owned
or operated (n = 297, 52.3%). Within the public organisations,
approximately a quarter (n = 73, 24.6%) are from central gov-
ernment and local government (n = 66, 22.2%) respectively,
and just over half fall in the ‘other’ category (n = 158,
53.2%). The remainder of the organisations are relatively even-
ly split between privately run organisations (n = 143, 25.2%)
and third sector organisations (n = 128, 22.5%). On the one
hand, this suggests that the UK government’s efforts to help
mainstream adaptation and encourage a more bottom-up ap-
proach where organisations beyond the state take over respon-
sibility for adaptation planning and implementation may be
bedding in. On the other hand, private organisations still only
account for about a quarter of the overall total named organisa-
tions. One reason for this could be due to the purpose of official
documents and practical limits on them. Listing every organi-
sation that has a role or responsibility regarding climate change
adaptation not only runs the risk of a lengthy who’s who of the
UK but also reduces the readability of the document.
Of interest here is that nearly a quarter (n = 128, 22.5%) of
all organisations were from the third sector including trade
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associations, trade bodies or professional networks. These al-
ready have systems in place to reach a large audience on
behalf of the UK government and tailor the message for them.
Those frequently cited included the National Farmers Union,
the Association of British Insurers and Energy Network
Providers, who collectively represent thousands of individuals
and organisations.
A different pattern emerged, however, when we look at the
top 10% of organisations cited (see Table 1). Most organisa-
tions were publicly owned or run (n = 47, 82.5%) with a much
smaller number from the private (n = 2, 3.5%) or third sector
(n = 8, 14.0%). It thus seems as if the rhetoric, encouraging
more bottom-up adaptation by private actors and organisa-
tions, set out by the first UK NAP 2013 is not reflected in
the documents published by the government. This is particu-
larly noteworthy as it relates to whom the UK government
sees as the most significant adaptation organisations, and im-
portantly, points to a disconnect between recent rhetoric and
the inherent inertia of past actions.
Of the 47 public organisations cited in the top 10% of orga-
nisations, by far, the main group was central government (n =
36, 76.6%). Within this subset, we find that government agen-
cies (n = 19, 40.4%), including the Environment Agency, the
NHS, and Highways Agency as well as Her Majesty’s
Government Ministries and Departments (n = 14, 29.8%) such
as Defra, the Department for Communities and Local
Government, and Department of Transport, occupy the top
two groupings. This high proportion of central government
organisations means adaptation responsibilities are spread
across government departments, all of which have different
remits, resources and commitments to adaptation. This can
make a coherent and coordinated approach challenging.
Despite the emphasis on the need for local level adaptation,
Local Government organisations only comprise a small per-
centage of key actors (n = 5, 10.9%).
If we focus on the top 5 organisations cited most often, a
broad mix of remits is found from national/local policy, plan-
ning and implementation (e.g. Defra, Environment Agency,
Local Authorities, Parliament), to efforts to raise awareness
of climate change and improve decision-making (e.g.
UKCIP). No private organisations made it into the top 10.
This could be because sectors such as water in England oper-
ate regionally, not nationally, or the high number of competi-
tors in sectors including energy, which naturally limit the
dominance of a single organisation. That said, the highest
ranked private organisation was Network Rail (rank 26), re-
sponsible for the UK’s railway infrastructure, followed by the
National Grid (rank 40), responsible for the UK’s electricity
and gas network.
Two points are worth flagging up here. First, the two pri-
vate organisations in the top 10% of organisations come from
the following two sectors: energy and transport, whilst other
major sectors dominated by private entities including food,
retail and finance are absent. Second, whilst adaptation to
climate change is legislated nationally, we find a clear geo-
graphical imbalance and a very England-centric focus—no
organisations in the top 10% are based in any of the devolved
administrations: Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland.
The dominance of central government organisations
drops away when we code and rank all 568 organisations
by their primary sector instead of by their type. In the
place of the central government, we find that local gov-
ernment (n = 69, 12.1%) becomes the dominant sector,
spanning councils, resilience forums and local govern-
ment networks. This affirms the crucial role played by
local level planning and decision-making in adaptation
(Porter et al. 2015). The second highest ranked sector
was transport (n = 65, 11.4%), covering roads, rails,
planes and boats. Again, this supports findings from other
studies that place transport at the centre of adaptation
activities (see Eisenack and Stecker 2012; Walker et al.
2015). The third biggest sector was education and re-
search (n = 61, 10.7%) comprising of universities, re-
search institutions and programmes, with the energy
(n = 56, 9.9%), conservation and environment (n = 43,
7.6%), and water (n = 38, 6.7%) sectors ranked fourth,
fifth and sixth respectively.
Out of the 568 organisations identified, only a small
number belong to the finance (n = 20, 3.5%), business
(n = 16, 2.8%) or the agricultural (n = 8, 1.4%) sectors.
Both the UK’s first CCRA and the economic assessment
behind the NAP highlighted the serious risks posed by
climate change to food security and future trade (HR
Wallingford 2012; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013). It was
found that the international risks posed by climate change
to the UK could be ‘an order of magnitude larger than
domestic threats and opportunities’ particularly for ‘busi-
ness (trade/investment) and food (supply chains)’
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013: p. 2). Not only does this
point to a lack of awareness over who is a relevant adap-
tation organisation in these sectors but also raises ques-
tions about whether these sectors have the capacity to
cope with future stresses.
Another sector ranked lowly was communications (n =
9, 1.6%), populated by telephone, broadband and internet
providers. Given the increasing reliance of other sectors
on telecommunications, due in part to the growth of
digitised operations, our review helps identify the problem
of treating sectors as discrete, self-contained, entities.
Sectors rarely act alone. Rather they are reliant, sometimes
unknowingly, on (invisible) interactions with others. Low
levels of awareness of how different sectors are connected
to one another, or are needed to help others function prop-
erly, could lead to a domino effect where risks in one
sector cascade through the system to bring about wide-
spread failures (Committee on Climate Change 2017).
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To what extent has the pattern of organisations
identified in official documents changed
from 2006–2015?
Between 2006 and 2015, the UK experienced considerable
political change. Three different governments were elected,
new legislation dedicated to tackling climate change was in-
troduced and austerity measures were implemented across
public services. That withstanding, we found the same orga-
nisations were cited repeatedly each year by official climate
change adaptation documents. Yet the frequency, and order, of
these organisations within the top 10% did change as did the
number of adaptation documents published year-on-year.
Figure 1 tracks the number of official climate adaptation
documents published each year and reveals two key trends.
First, almost half of all official documents written between
2006 and 2015 were clustered into only two consecutive years,
2010 and 2011 (n = 78, 45%). Second, after 2011, we see a
distinct decline again in the overall number of adaptation doc-
uments. By 2015, the number of climate change adaptation
publications has shrunk by 71% since 2010, dropping below
the 2006 baseline (2015: n = 13, 2006: n = 14). Several political
changes track these developments. In mid-2010, the
Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government came to
power, after the Labour government lost the general election,
which was followed in 2015 by a Conservative government.
Furthermore, two adaptation landmarks introduced by the
Climate Change Act 2008—the UK’s first CCRA in 2012
and NAP in 2013—were unable to create as much of a drive
towards adaptation as can be seen through the much larger
numbers in adaptation publications of earlier years.
Of course, the number of official climate change adaptation
documents issued every year should not be confused with
progress on planning and implementing actions but the overall
decline in numbers, as shown in Fig. 1, suggests that
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Fig. 1 Number of official climate change adaptation publications by year,
2006–2015
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adaptation is no longer receiving the same level of policy
support and attention. For instance, in 2013 Defra, who are
responsible for the UK climate change adaptation policy cut
adaptation funding by nearly 40% (from £13.65 million in
2011/2012 to £8.31 million in 2013/14) (Defra 2014), and
Defra officials working on adaptation were cut from 38 to 6
(Harvey 2013).
To understand how the distribution of key organisations
cited in official climate adaptation documents has changed
between 2006 and 2015, we introduced four distinct
timeframes: (i) quarter 1, from January 2006 to June 2008,
(ii) quarter 2, from July 2008 to December 2010, (iii) quarter
3, from January 2011 to June 2013 and (iv) quarter 4, from
July 2013 to October 2015 (Fig. 2).
Turning first to the composition of all 568 organisations by
sector, we calculated how the percentage of each sector
changed according to how many organisations were men-
tioned in that quarter. We found that, regardless of the ebbs
and flows in the number of adaptation publications per quar-
ter, four sectors were repeatedly in the top five: transport,
energy, conservation and environment, and education and re-
search, if not in a slightly different order each time. Local
Government was also prominent in three of the four quarters,
only to be replaced by the water sector in the final quarter.
Likewise, the bottom five sectors always included art, culture,
media and sport, and insurance, and in three out of four quar-
ters, tourism and security. We find similarities for the top 10%
of organisations with conservation and environment, and
transport in the top 5 consistently, and local government in a
prominent first or second position in three of the four quarters.
The retail, tourism, charity and arts, culture, media and sports
sectors were not present in the top 10% in any of the quarters,
and the emergency, security and communications sectors were
absent in three of the four quarters.
The lack of inter-variability of organisations by sectors in
each quarter, and across the decade, may suggest on the one
hand that awareness of what adaptation work is needed, and
most importantly, by whom, is well ingrained within UK gov-
ernment thinking. On the other hand, this may also suggest that
the UK government is either unaware of the key role and re-
sponsibilities that less well-cited sectors can play in adaptation
or that persistent barriers exist that prevent them from being
fully engaged. This is underlined by the fact that some sectors
that are extremely relevant to both planning for adaptation and
extreme events as well as responding to them seem to be en-
tirely disengaged. The insurance sector, for example is repre-
sented by less than 1% of organisations in each quarter and the
share of the communications and emergency sectors both
shrank by 32% by 2013–2015 compared with 2006–2008.
When we focus on the top 10 organisations cited per quar-
ter, as shown in Table 2, we find that organisations with the
same core roles and/or responsibilities consistently appeared:
national and local policymakers, planners and implementers
(e.g. Defra, Local Authorities), government agencies (i.e.
Environment Agency), legislators (i.e. parliament) and those
tasked with raising awareness and offering decision support
on climate change (e.g. UKCIP). Of these, there is very little
change in the top 5, with Defra always ranked first, the
Environment Agency always ranked second or third and
Local Authorities ranked between second and fourth.
UKCIP2 also ranked third, fourth and sixth in the first three
quarters. Together, these four actors account for 38%, of all
references across the decade. Interestingly, in the final quarter,
2013–2015, the National Health Service and Public Health
England jumped up the list. The reason for this is due, in part,
to 6 of the 13 documents published that quarter, focusing on
climate change impacts and health.
Our results suggest that the attention given to sectors can
quickly increase when sufficient political support exists. Yet,
key sectors not only remain absent (e.g. retail and tourism) or
largely absent (e.g. security, communications, finance and
emergency) but also the gap between them and the more
established adaptation sectors remains as large as before.
No private organisation featured in the top 10 between 2006
and 2015. The closest was the consultancy HR Wallingford
(which led the development of the UK’s first CCRA) ranked
23rd in the third quarter, 2011–2013, followed by the train
operator Network Rail ranked 31st and 26th in the second
(2008–2010) and fourth (2013–2015) quarter respectively. As
a result, the top 10 is occupied almost exclusively by public
organisations, with the only exception being civil society
appearing in seventh place in the third quarter (2011–2013).
Discussion and conclusion
We find that official climate change adaptation documents
show that the UK Government is aware of, and committed
to, engaging as diverse a mix of adaptation actors as possible.
Different types/sizes of organisations, working within differ-
ent sectors, across different scales, and performing different
roles and/or responsibilities, are all identified. Such diversity
ensures that different values, interests and concerns are repre-
sented (Green et al. 2018). Yet, despite the UK government
clearly calling for a more bottom-up approach to adaptation in
its NAP, we found little evidence that this rhetoric is consis-
tently reflected in the documents the government has pub-
lished on adaptation between 2006 and 2015.
For instance, adaptation roles and/or responsibilities were
two times more likely to be assigned to public than private
organisations, and slightly more likely to focus on central
government compared with local government actors. On the
2 UKCIP drops out of the top 10 for the first time in the fourth quarter, 2013–
2015, when its official funding relationship with the UK government ended
and the Environment Agency’s Climate Ready team took over.
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one hand, this suggests that the UK Government recognises
that for adaptation to be effective it must be integrated into
every governance level of the policies/services it provides.
Yet, it can be risky to expect central and/or local government
to spearhead adaptation efforts when these actors are sensitive
to political agendas. Indeed, from 2006 to 2015, we have
witnessed several substantial changes affecting the key actors
identified in the documents. Climate change funding from the
government was cut. Not only did this affect Defra but it also
led to UKCIP’s responsibilities being initially transferred to
the Environment Agency’s Climate Ready team, which itself
has now been closed with no replacement planned (Salvidge
2016). In addition, since 2010, Local Government spending
has been cut by 40% (Hastings et al. 2015) leading to staff
redundancies and adaptation being deprioritised to safeguard
frontline services (Fitzgerald and Lupton 2015; Porter et al.
2015; Lorenz et al. 2017). Furthermore, the institutional ar-
rangements for mitigation and adaptation have been revised
(e.g. DECC), as well as climate reporting requirements re-
laxed (e.g. ARP). With government departments, agencies
and public bodies shouldering the majority of adaptation roles
and/or responsibilities, questions remain about ‘who’will step
in if central and/or local government do not have the institu-
tional capacity or political will to adapt and make meaningful
changes (cf. Porter et al. 2015).
By identifying which organisations national governments
deem essential to ensuring their country is well adapted, and
the extent to which the pattern of organisations and sectors
changes over time, we are able to assess what is working well
and where more attention is needed. In the case of the UK,
infrastructural systems, which are crucial to the resilience and
robustness of energy, and transport services, are all highly
cited. Yet, some individual sectors, including finance and tele-
communications, are largely absent from official climate
change adaptation documents. No mentions are made of the
finance sector in the last quarter of the decade analysed. This
is a little surprising given the finance sector contributed £119
billion to the UK economy in 2017 (6.5% of total economic
output) (Rhodes 2018). In turn, the interdependency of risks
shared across sectors is also concerning. When Storm
Desmond hit the UK in 2017, ‘failures of electricity and tele-
communications networks, and bridges, quickly and unpre-
dictably affect[ed] other services, heightening disruption and
hampering the efforts of emergency services’ (Committee on
Climate Change 2017: p. 17). A lack of awareness, or willing-
ness, to address climate risks in one sector can cascade
through the entire system, putting everyone at risk.
Our research shows that identifying and tracking key
adaptation actors is a useful first step in understanding the
political commitment of national governments to tackle
climate change, (cf. Lesnikowski et al. 2013; Ford et al.
2015). However, our research also highlights that rhetoric
and reality are not the same. In the case of the UK, the
call for a more bottom-up approach to adaptation is not
reflected in the types of organisations named by central
government publications. Whilst documents published by
the UK government will arguably focus on assigning ad-
aptation roles and responsibilities to other government
actors, our study importantly names organisations that
the UK government has self-identified as needing to col-
laborate with, or support, if the UK is to adapt. Indeed,
Defra’s latest National Adaptation Plan reiterates that
‘Adapting to our changing climate cannot be done by
government alone. It will require collaboration across
Fig. 2 Distribution of top 10% of
organisations by sector per
quarter, 2006–2015. For ease of
graph readability, only sectors
with organisations that reached
3% or more were depicted (for a
full breakdown of sectors by
quarter, please see Online
Supplementary Material 6)
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civil society, local authorities, private and public sectors
and infrastructure providers’ (Defra 2018: p. 5). Yet, if the
UK government is serious about encouraging a more
bottom-up and collaborative approach to adaptation, then
the diversity of organisations cited, and the importance
assigned to them will need to change. A next step here
is to explore ‘who’ other adaptation actors—beyond cen-
t ral government— ident i fy as having key roles /
responsibilities via documents including publicly avail-
able adaptation plans, strategies, policies or ARP reports.
The method we have presented here offers a new, insightful
addition to the adaptation tracking literature. It also speaks to
recent calls for research that aims to globally assess adaptation
actions—as required by Article 7 of the Paris Agreement—by
building on Tompkin et al.’s (2018) proposed stocktaking ap-
proach. Our method could be upscaled to identify and track
actors alongside the categorisation of the adaptation actions
they take. Alongside other national adaptation tracking studies
(cf. Tompkins et al. 2010; Bierbaum et al. 2013), this method
enables a longitudinal analysis of which actors are seen to be
essential to making adaptation happen by government depart-
ments, identifies differences in the type/size, remits and how
capacities of these actors vary, flags up where gaps exist in
sectors and where interventions are needed, and how and why
the diversity and pattern of these actors changes over time.
Importantly, such analyses critically assess whether the global
adaptation status of individual countries marries up with the
local reality or if high-performing countries share particular
characteristics. It also allows us to examine whether high-level
government visions and aspirations for adaptation are indeed
grounded in reality as set out by more detailed government
publications on the topic.
In terms of future research, a global comparison of coun-
tries that achieved the maximum adaptation initiative index
score and those that scored the lowest could help identify
similarities/differences in the diversity of adaptation actor
landscapes in each country. Eisenack and Stecker’s (2012)
conceptualisation of different functional roles in adaptation
actions, ranging from exposure unit, operator and receptor
offers another fruitful avenue to explore. Applying this frame-
work could help answer the questions: does one type of actor
dominate the landscape, where is a rebalance needed and do
particular actor types go hand-in-hand with particular gover-
nance styles? Heeding the growing calls for a more consistent,
coherent, comparable and comprehensive approach to identi-
fying and tracking adaptation actors and actions (Ford and
Berrang-Ford 2016; Tompkins et al. 2018), our research un-
derlines why it is important that we better understand ‘who’ is
being asked to adapt.
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Table 2 Top 10 organisations per quarter, 2006–2015 (for details on how the organisations were ranked—see Methods)
Rank Quarter 1 (2006–2008) Rank Quarter 2 (2008–2010) Rank Quarter 3 (2011–2013) Rank Quarter 4 (2013–2015)
1 Department for Environment
Food and Rural Affairs
1 Department for Environment
Food and Rural Affairs
1 Department for Environment
Food and Rural Affairs
1 Department for Environment
Food and Rural Affairs
2 Environment Agency 2 Local Authorities 2 Environment Agency 2 Environment Agency
3 UK Climate Impacts
Programme
3 Environment Agency 3 Local Authorities 3 Local Authorities
4 Local Authorities 4 UK Climate Impacts
Programme
4 Department of Energy and
Climate Change
4 Public Health England
5 Department for Transport 5 Department of Energy and
Climate Change
5 Meteorological Office 5 Climate Ready
6 Parliament 6 Parliament 6 UK Climate Impacts
Programme
6 National Health Service
7 Her Majesty’s Treasury 7 Department for Transport 7 Civil society 7 Natural England
8 National Audit Office 8 Carbon Trust 8 Adaptation Sub-Committee 8 Department for Communities
and Local Government
9 Meteorological Office 9 Department for Communities
and Local Government
9 Natural England 9= Department of Energy and
Climate Change
10 National Health Service 10 Her Majesty’s Treasury 10 Parliament 9= Parliament
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